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Lintner (1956) was the first to propose that dividends could carry 
some type of information. He concluded that managers (o.f larger firms) 
were averse to lowering their dividends, decreasing them only when they 
\..rere sure that cash flows could not support the payout rate and vice versa 
for dividend increases. The information seen by Lintner \vas that divi-
dends gave some clue as to management's certainty of present earnings. 
The closer the actual dividend to the firm's target payout, the more certain 
managers are of present earnings. 
Miller and Hodigliani (1961) on the other hand, suggest that a firm's 
d-i··:;:icnds are a function of future expected earnings. A change in divi-
dends is seen as change in management's expectations of future earnings, 
not dependent upon present and past firm performance. It is further 
stated that even though dividend policy per se is irrelevant to the value 
of the firm, a change in a stable dividend pattern could be perceived by 
investors as a signal of changes in management's expectations of future 
firm perfornance. 
Tests of the "Information Content of Dividends" hypothesis are gen-
erally in disagreement about the amount and the use of the hypothesized 
information in the dividend change. It is thought that these disagree-
ments have arisen for several reasons: 1) Assuming that all firms follow 
a similar dividend generating process. This has led to the failure to 
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distinguish dividend changes which are signals from those lvhich are not, 
and those which are 11 true11 from those ~.;rhich are 11 false. 11 2) Hethodolo-
gical and sampling errors which have led to erroneous conclusions about 
the information available. These will be briefly discussed in section 
III. 
In keeping with the above discussion, this paper will attempt to 
test the usefulness of the hypothesized information by Separating those 
changes which are signals from those which are not by observing firm 
performance around the dividend change. At the same time, try to ans~ver 
the following questions: 1) Can the investor use the information in a 
dividend change to determine whether or not the firm is signaling?, and 
2) If a firm is found to be signaling true one time, can the investor 
expect this to happen again? 
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CHAPTER II 
DIVIDEND CHANGES AS SIGNALS 
A. Reasons for Expecting Signals 
There are t\om conceptual reasons ~.;hy \ve should expect firms to engage 
in some type of signaling or information transfer: 1) Informational 
asymmetries, and 2) Expectational asymmetries. In a theoretical paper, 
Leland and Pyle (1977) state that, in financial markets, informational 
asymmetries are particularly pronounced. Due to their position, managers 
have more information concerning their O\VI1 abilities, the general health 
of the firm, and a closer view of the firm's opportunities and threats 
than do investors. They have \vhat has come to be kno\VI1 as "inside infor-
mation." Jaffee (1971-t) showed the non-triviality of this information by 
finding that trading securities on the basis of this information leads 
to abnormal returns. 
Often management's expectations of the future prospects of the firm 
seem more optimistic than those of investors' asymmetric expectations. 
First, due to the informational asymmetries discussed above, management 
may have good reason to be optimistic. Second, there may be a substan-
tial re\·Jard for exaggerating the positive qualities of a firm and "play-
ing down" the negGtive, constituting a "moral hazard" problem. Thus, not 
all forms of information transfer are credible. 
Information can gain increased credibility by not being direct and 
not being costless. Indirect information transfer circumvents the moral 
hazard problem. Then, rather than listening to V-rhat management says, the 
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investor may do well to observe what management does as "actions speak 
louder than Hords." At the same time, there are very fe'" actions \vhich 
management may take that are costless. That is, most actions have a 
penalty for being wrong. The higher the cost of being \rrong, the less 
likely management will take the incorrect action and "place their heads 
on the chopping block." KnoHing that it is in the firm's (and the 
manager's) best interest to be acting correctly, the investor can use 
the actions as signals. 
B. Dividend Changes as Signals 
In line with the above discussion, certain types of dividend changes 
are conceptually good candidates for use as signal devices. Dividend 
changes as information carriers are neither direct nor costless. The 
dividend change is an action by management Hhich has placed the firm in 
a position where it is legally bound to pay dividends once they are de-
clared and generally a higher level of firm performance is needed to 
support a higher level of dividends. 
There are several conditions vlhich could be perceived as desirable 
for the dividend change to be a signal: 1) The firm must have a normally 
stable dividend policy (Miller and Modigliani, 1961), 2) The change or 
the magnitude of the change must be unexpected (Watts, 1973), and 3) The 
change should be perceived as "permanent," or inflexible. 
The more stable a firm's divid2nd policy, the easier an investor can 
locate the changes which might be signals. This does not necessarily mean 
the div:idend must be unchanging, just that changes (if any) are predict-
able and fall into a lmm·m pattern. This is, an investor Hill more likely 
discern a possible relationship between the change in dividends and future 
firm performance if he knows the present relationship bet\veen dividends 
and firm performance. 
Similarly, the change or the magnitude of the change must be unex-
pected. A moment's consideration will reveal the impossibility of an 
expected change to carry useful information. If the investor knows of 
the change, he either has "inside information" or he is getting his in-
formation from publicly available sources. However, we are speaking of 
the normal investor, who does not have "inside information." In an ex-
pected dividend change, we would find that a change in firm performance 
leads the dividend chanr,e; in an unexpected change, the dividend change 
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.Juld lead firm performance. Thus, the expected dividend change is the 
result of a change in firm performance and the unexpected change is the 
result of a change in management's expectations of future performance. 
Then, for the information hypothesis to have merit, a change in firm per-
formance must occur subsequent to the unexpected change in dividends. 
Finally, the unexpected change must be perceived as a permanent. 
If a future change in firm performance is related to the change in divi-
dends, a temporary change \vould be perceived as carrying little informa-
tion about the value of the firm as short-term performance does not 
affect the value. It is to be assumed that the only v1ay an investor 
can benefit is if the value of the firm changes. 
It should not be assumed that all unexpected dividend changes are 
true, or even signals. A firm may be changing its payout rate due to, 
for example, a lack of investment opportunities. Black and Scholes (1973) 
found that a change in payout would no:: lead to increased firm value, 
a "bird in hand" fallacy. Believing, erroneously, that investors place 
6 
a premium on stocks with high payouts, managers might be trying to in-
crease the value of the firm. Finally, it is possible that, for one rea-
son or another, management's expectations are not realized. Due to the 
possibility of false and non--signals, a second requirement for the infor-
mation hypothesis to have merit is that the investor must be able to dis-
tinguish dividend changes \vhich are signals carrying useful information 
from those that are not. 
CHAPTER III 
PREVIOUS STUDIES 
There have been numerous empirical studies of dividend policies. For 
the most part they fall into two broad categories, those using earnings as 
a performance measure (Ang, 1974; Fama and Babiak, 1969; Hatts, 1973) and 
those using risk-adjusted stock returns (Charest, 1978; Griffin, 1976; 
Pettit, 1972). For the sake of brevity, only Watts (1973) and Charest 
(1978) will be discussed at any length. 
Watts explicitly assumes that all firms follow a partial adjustment 
process and forced his entire sample to conform to a partial adjustment 
regression equation (see Nerlove, 1958; Fama and Babiak, 1969). After re-
,-,-, ·::ssing the change in the dividend against past earnings, present earnings 
and last period's dividend, ~·Jatts used· the error term, a measure of the 
unexpected change in the dividend, to predict changes in the following 
period's earnings. Via this process, he concluded that there was little 
information in dividend changes. Ang (1974) cast doubt on the partial 
adjustment type model used by Hatts, as it did not "fit" the data very 
well. Thus, using the residual ter~ as the unexpected change in dividends 
would likely generate erroneous signals. There are also several problems 
involved with using earnings as a measure of firm performance: 1) Earnings 
are accounting variables and are subject to bias. By changing accounting 
methods, one can cause earnings to vary greatly. 2) Earnings figures 
alone ignore what the industry and market as a whole are doing. That is, 
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earnings may increase after a dividend increase, but relative to the market 
and industry, they may be losing ground. 3) Due to numbers 1 and 2, there 
is the problem of computing the unexpected change in dividends and the unex-
pected change in earnings. 
Even though Charest (1978) used risk-adjusted returns as a measure of 
firm performance, he ignored the possibility of different dividend policies. 
This leads to \vhat has been called an "anticipation effect," a term coined 
by Fama, Fisher, Jensen and Roll (1969). It refers to the fact that a group 
of dividend-increasing stocks (or decreasing) begin making abnormal returns 
as much as 12 months before the dividend change, and has been explained as 
.,vestOrs anticipating the change in dividends and are thus placing a pre-
mium on the higher dividend. Incidentally, this would also mean that the 
dividend change did not carry any information. Returning to Black and 
Scholes (1973), it is doubtful that the market is placing a premium on the 
dividend change. It is my contention that the abnormal returns are caused 
by changes in firm performance, the same changes \vhich lead to the changes 
in dividends. In his sample, dividend-increasing firms continue earning 
abnormal returns after the change, so there are likely fe>.;rer firms Hho 
pursue an "information" type dividend policy, since the bulk of the abnor-
mal returns occur before the change. It is also felt the reason the 
returns did not cumulate as much follm.;ring the change in dividends v1as 
that Charest placed no restrictions on the stability of the dividend 




A. Sample and Data 
The sample of firms comes from Standard and Poor 1 s 40·-·quorter COHPUSTAT 
tape (July, 1968 to July, 1978). Firms enter the dividend changing sample 
on the basis that there Here no cash dividend changes for at least eight 
quarters before the change and that, once changed, '\·JOuld remain at that 
level for at least eight more quarters. At the same time, a sample of 
r111s vlBS drmm Hhich did not change their dividend over a period of 16 
quarters. In order to test whether or not a firm which signals true once 
will do it again, a sample of dividend increases vras taken from the sample 
of firms Hhich had already increased their dividends once. So for each 
dividend-increasing firm, there are two dividend increasing periods. The 
total sample consists of 116 firms increasing their dividend, 43 firms de-
creasing, and 102 firms which did not cL&nge their dividend. Data '\vas 
unavailable to draw a second change for the decreasing group. At the same 
time the sample was chosen, 48 months of stock prices around the dividend 
change \vas dra'\m. Obviously, this is not a large: amount of data; hoHcver, 
by increasing its length substantially would have caused a decrease in the 
number of firms vJhich changed their divide;nd tHice. 
A note about the COYJ)USTAT tape nust be made. \{hile a firm may have 
40 quarters of data, beginning data dates do not coincide across firms. 
Actual data dates 1verc found to be as muc.h as 12 mom:h.s out of line with 
one another. Due to the nature of this re:search, the actual data clat2s 
9 
10 
had to be found. These were found throtigh a time-consuming process of cross-
checking via the ISL Daily Stock Price Index. A second problem found was 
that stock prices are reported on the tape in dollars and eighths instead 
of dollars and cents. 
The dividend announcement months Here found in Standard and Poor's 
Annual Dividend Record along vlith the payment month of the dividend. It 
should be mentioned that the signal occurs in the month of announcement, 
not in the month of payment as once declared, payment is a certainty. The 
payment month is assumed to be in the same month each quarter (first, second 
or third). Other data needed is the 30-day Treashry Bill rate and the mar-
ket rate of return, both found in Sinquefeld and Ibbotson (1976). 
B. I'Ieasuring Firm Performance 
To measure changes in firm performance, the excess returns form of 
Jensen's Index (Jensen, 1975) will be used. The Index is a combination of 
Sharpe's (1963) diagonal model (market model) and the capital asset pricing 







Y a. + B X + u 
jt J j mt jt 
The return on sc;curity j over period t, less the riskless 
rate of return over period t. 
The return on the T._l_~::!:.~~ over period t, less the riskless 
rate of return over period t. 
The coefficients will be estimated using ordinary least squares (OLS) and 
a deletion approach. This Hill be done by using the 48 months of data and 
deleting months -11 through +12, Hhcrc month 0 is the announcement month. 
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This was done so that any abnormal occurrences in the 24-month period 
(-11 to +12) about the dividend change announcement month Hould not bias 
the coefficients: Assuming the coefficients are stationary over time, 
there should be no problem in using the months subsequ~nt to the deleted 
period. This is a reasonable assumption, since the total period is short 
(49 months). Thus, the coefficients will be estimated with 24 months of 
data. The abnormal returns for the deleted period, the period of interest, 
can be computed by applying the following model to months -11 to +12: 
u = y - (~. + B X ) 
jt jt J j mt 
where ~ and S are the estimated coefficients, and Y and X are the same as 
- efore. Thus, U. is the measurement of the deviation of a security's 
Jt 
return from its normal relationship in time t. Over time, the drift from 
the normal relationship can be calculated: 




"' L. UJ.t 
t=-11 
of the CU. nroxy the truth of the signal. J ' ~ The 
abnormal returns can now be grouped by several criteria: 1) the direction 
of the dividend change, 2) the "size" of the dividend change, and 3) by 
the 11 truth 11 of the previous dividend change for the dividend-increasing 
stocks. The size measure will simply be the percentage change in the divi-




2: U. I , for any t -11 to +12 
j==l Jt N 
\vhere N is the number of stocks in the p,roup. Group performance over time 
can be calculated in the same manner as single stocks. 
As mentioned earlier, there is a possibility that the coefficients 
are not stationary. If the coefficients are not stationary as assumed, 
then even Generalized Least Squares (GLS) will not provide an unbiased 
estimate of the expected return. This would cause the absolute values of 
the U. to be large, on the average (Pettit, 1972). A large number of 
jt 
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firms in the sample "\vould minimize this problem. Thus, there is no problem 
with the groupings by the direction only. However, measuring smaller 
groups (14-25) could cause the results to be especially biased, as with the 
truth measure the very means of grouping is the possibly biased number. 
Also, the relative shortness of the data stream prevents the use of "mov-
ing betas." If the truth measure is biased, the alternative is to use 
Frequency data, assuming that the direction of the truth measure is not 
bi~2Pd. In particular the chi-square test of independence will be used. 
This will be done by grouping the returns by size measures against the 
direction of the cumulation. Truth in the first period will also be tested 
against truth in the second dividend-changing period. 
CHAPTER V 
RESULTS 
A. Creating Efficient Estimators 
The above regression was run for the 375 dividend changing (or non-
changing) periods. In roughly 20% of the cases, auto-correlation was 
found. While only 6% were significant using the Durbin-Hatson d statistic 
at the 5% level, it was felt that, since the data. stream \vas short, if the 
statistic fell in the inconclusive range serial correlation should be 
assumed. At first it was thought that this was due to the non-independence 
of price changes around a dividend _c;h~e. However, by observing the break-· 
dmvns of the three samples, the 20% figure is consistent throughout. This 
leads to the conclusion that many of the stock~ successive price changes 
are not independent for this sample. 
Regardless of the reason for tl1e serial correlation, the estimated 
coefficients are not at their minimum variance. While the coefficients 
are unbiased and consistent, the use of the OLS estimates for "prediction" 
as we are doing here can cause the prediction error to be quite high. 
Also, in the face of serially-correlated disturbances, the usual OLS 
statistics, t and F, .1re invalid (liu;;.ag, 1970). 
There is no choice at this point but to transform the data and use 
GLS. The method for estimating the coefficients to be used is tiw Paris-
Winston Two-Step (Ray, 1979). The first step is to apply OLS to the 
original equation. Using the computed residuals, Qjt' an estimate of the 
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autocorrelation coefficient can be obtained: 
/\2 
u . 1 Jt-
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where p is the autocorrelation coefficient, for all t except the 24 months 
around the change. Using p, the data is then transformed: 
Hjt Y. R for t=l ]t J 
w. Y. " for t=2 ••. T - pY. 1 ]t ]t ]t-
c--r.-
0 X zJl-{1? for t=l 'mt mt J 
Qmt X " for t=2 ... T pX ~ J rnt mL- _ 
For the second step, the follovling equation is estimated using OLS to 
obtain the coefficients: 
W. = a. o1 + B. Q2 + eJ. t ]t J - t J t 
deleting the same months (-11 to +12). Keeping in mind the estimated 
autocorrelation structure, tl1e abnormal returns can be calculated: 
Selected cross-sectional statistics for each of the groups is given in 
Table 1. A comparison between OLS and GLS abnormal returns is given in 
Table 2. The differences are not great; ho~ever, if placed in small groups, 
several autocorrelated return streams could bias the results. Subsequently, 
the GLS estimated returns will be reported. 
TABLE 1 
SELECTED CROSS-SECTIONAL REGRESSION STATISTICS 
Quartile 
Standard 
Coefficient Hean Error 1 2 3 
B-lst 1.1015 .5401 .4913 .8902 1.2001 
a-1st . 0039 • 0183 -. 0154 -.0036 .0067 
p-lst -.1798 .2060 -.4398 -.2561 -.1091 
R2-lst .3241 .1764 • 1 or, 4 .2665 .3788 
.9807 .5034 . 5030 .7934 1. 0871 
a-Lnd .0000 .0191 -. 0245 -.0037 .0055 
p-2nd -.1493 .1858 -.3742 -.2229 -.0914 
R2-2nd .3382 .1985 .0955 .2583 .3925 
B-non 1.1698 . 5496 • L,4 7 6 1.0190 1. 3 621 
a-non -.0029 .0221 -.0270 --. 0068 .0022 
p-non -.1132 .2102 -. 3688 -.1772 -. 06Lt3 
R2-no- .2691 .1784 . 07 62 .2571 .3743 
:r.:c 1. 2312 ,LI864 . 623Lf 1.0740 1.3339 
a-dec -·. 0086 • 0185 -.0339 -. 0134 -.002fi 
p-dec .1507 .1859 -.3885 -.2306 -.0962 
R2-dec .2691 .1375 .0882 .2157 .3070 
Estimated model is: 
1st First dividr,nd increasing period for increasin2, sample 
2nd Second dividend increasing period for increasing sample 
·non ::\on-dividend changing s2mple 











































1. N = 116 
TABLE 2 
CO:HPARISON BET~·JEEN GLS AND OLS ABNORNAL RETURNS1 










































































































B. Abnormal Returns and Investment Policy 
Hmv should the investor act on the basis of a dividend change or a 
lack of? Shmvn in Table 3 are the average abnormal returns for each period, 
the cumulative average returns for a 24-month holding period, and the cumu-
lative average returns for a holding period of 12 months on the basis of 
dividend information, for each of the groups of stocks based on the divi-
dend change direction. The non-changing group is behaving exactly as it 
was anticipated, abnormal returns moving randomly around zero with no cumula-
tion to speak of. Hhile investing in securities that do not change their 
ividend for eight quarters appears to lose about 2% over the 12 months 
after the change, it is felt that this is "luck of the drmv." 
The performance in general for dividend-increasing and dividend-
decreasing stocks is counter-intuitive. It was expected that any relation-
ship between the dividend change and the returns after the dividend change 
uld be positive, the cumulative returns moving in the same direction as 
the dividend change. The pre-announcement period results are consistent 
with the results over the same period with earlier studies. For example, 
Charest's (1978) sample of dividend-increasing stocks cumulate to 10.52% 
for the same period that dividend-increasing stocks in this study cumulate 
to 10.15%. For decreasing stocks, ClJarest's cumulated to -2o.;u,%, \vhile 
in this study, they cumulate to -18.36%. Eere, hoHever, the similarities 
end. In most other studies, the abnonwl returns continue to cumulate in 
the expected direction in the post-announcenent period, while in this 
study, they begin to move in the _<?l'J2_'.)Si_t__r::_ direction. A reconcilitition 
of these results ,.,Jill be ::;ivcn in Section VI. It \wulcl seem in general 
that most signals are false signals for investors .::mel the best policy 
18 
TABLE 3 
COHPARISON OF THE RETURNS ON ALL TYPES OF DIVIDEND CHANGES 
Non-Changing 
1 . 'd d2 Dividend 3 DlVl en 
Dividend Decreasing Increasing 
AU CAU AU CAUt AU CAU t t t t t t 
.0051 .0051 .0058 .0058 • 0042 .0042 -11 
-.0022 .0029 .0112 • 0170 • 0168 .0210 -10 
.0142 . 0172 -.0097 • 0072 .0002 .0212 - 9 
.0056 .0229 -.0087 -.0014 • 0147 • 0359 - 8 
-.0054 • 0175 -.0126 -.OHO • 0078 . 0438 - 7 
-.0054 .0120 -.0117 -.0258 .0012 • 0451 - 6 
.0067 .0188 -. 0108 -. 0366 • 0036 .1488 - 5 
nmt, • 0113 .0045 -.0321 • 0073 .0561 - 4 
.0127 -.0231 -.0553 • 0077 • 0639 - 3 
.uUJG . 0164 -.0361 -.0914 . 0117 .0756 - 2 
-.0191 -.0026 -.0167 -.1081 . 0079 . 0836 - 1 
.0098 .0071 .0000 -.0755 -.1836 .0000 . 0179 .1015 .0000 0 
.0095 • 0164 .0095 -.0264 -. 2100 -.0264 -.0007 .1008 -.0007 1 
-.0120 . 0045 -.0025 -.0207 -.2308 -. 0Lf 72 -. 0019 .0934 -.0026 2 
.0051 .0097 .0026 .0056 -.2251 -. 0!+15 .0008 .0997 -. 0018 3 
-.0067 .0029 -.0041 -. 0112 -.2364 -.0527 -. ()03 2 .0965 -.0050 4 
-.1424 -. 0112 -.0184 . 0048 -.2315 -. 047 9 . 0087 .1052 . 0037 5 
-.0107 -.0219 -.0291 .1427 -.1891 -.0055 -.0068 • 0984 -.0030 6 
. 0/2'; . 0004 -.0066 • 0207 -.1684 .0152 -. 0113 .0871 -. 0143 7 
·15 -.OllO -.0181 .0140 -.1543 .0292 .0013 . 0885 -.0130 8 
.0007 -.0102 -.0174 -.0140 -.1634 .0152 -.0060 .0824 -.0190 9 
-.0036 -.0139 -. 0210 .0067 -.1617 . 0219 -.0134 .0690 -.0324 10 
-.0065 -.0204 -.0276 • OllO -.1506 • 0287 -.0020 • 0670 -.0344 11 
.0045 -.0158 -. 0230 .0325 -.1181 .0612 -.0054 .0615 -.0399 12 
1. N 102 
2. N 43 
3. N = 232 
19 
apparently is not to invest in dividend-increasing (or sell dividend-
d~creasing) stocks solely on the information in the dividend change. Since 
data was not available for a second change in the decreasing category, the 
rest of the results refer only to the dividend-increasing sample. 
C. The Size and Truth of Signals 
Not all of the cumulative abnormal returns, CU., of the first dividend-
] 
increasing period are negative. Roughtly 48% of the returns in both the 
first and second changing periods cumulate positively. There is the problem, 
though, of determining which of the dividend changes are true signals before 
the fact. The first measure attempting to isolate the true signals was the 
s1ze measure, the percentage increase in the dividend. Using a cluster 
analysis program (B0illP), the percentage increases were divided into four 
classes for the first dividend change period. The returns were then grouped 
according to the size measure. The results of the cumulation from month 
zero to month 12 are given in Table 4. The only group in which a positive 
return is made is the greater than 5% and less then 12% dividend change. 
Ignoring the possible reasons for this, the same change size group for 
the second period ~vas tested. Hov1ever, the CU. v7as negative and it was 
J 
found that a policy of investing in these size dividend changes would not 
lead to any positive returns every time. 
The next measure used is the truth of the first signal. This is based 
on the belief that, once a security is found to be signaling true---regardless 
of the reasons (good management, nacure of the firm, etc.)---it is likely 
to do so again. The CU. were divided into four roughly equal size groups: 
J 
very positive, positive, negative, and very negative (in the first period). 





















ABNORHAL RETURNS BY THE SIZE OF THE DIVIDE~D CHANGE 
(First Change Period) 
1 Group 2 Group 3 Group 4 
CAD AU CAD AU CAD AU CAD 
t t t t t t t 
-.01351 .02790 .02790 -.00342 -.00342 .00399 .00339 
-.03027 .01461 .04251 -.02507 -.0281+9 . 02173 .02572 
-.04819 .01328 .05579 -.00431 -.03280 .02610 .05182 
-.05808 -.00626 .04953 -.02129 -.05409 -.03818 . 01364 
-.05210 -.00235 • 0!+ 718 -.00325 -.05734 .01391 .04555 
-.03041 -.00856 .03862 -.00129 -.05863 -. 0686Lf -.02309 
-.02827 .00201 .04063 -.01003 -.06866 -.03268 -.05577 
-.06343 . 0112!; .05187 -.00999 -.07865 .00123 -·. 05454 
-. 08592 -.01231 .03956 -.00668 -.08533 -.03266 -.08720 
-.07488 -.01856 . 02100 -.00706 -.09239 -.02706 -.11426 
-.07898 .013!~7 .03!+47 -.00895 -.10134 -.03597 -.15023 
-.07567 -.01147 .02300 .00012 -.10122 .02991 -.12032 
Change less than 5%, N = 14 
Change greater than or equal to 5'' ta and less than 12%, N = 45 
Change greater than or equal to 12% and less than 25%, N -- 43 
















according to Hhat they did the first period. The results in Table 5 give no 





















ABNORMAL RETURNS BY TRUTH OF THE FIRST SIGNAL 
(Second Increasing Period) 
1 Group 2 Group 3 Group 4 
CAU AU CAU AU CAU AU CAU 
t t t t t t t t 
-.01701 -.03290 -.03290 -.00455 -.00455 . 01332 .01332 1 
-.03562 -.00002 -.03292 . 00228 -.00227 .01604 .02936 2 
. 00072 -.00794 -. 0!>086 -.00433 -.00660 -.02904 .00032 3 
-.00454 . 00111 -.03975 . 01341 .00681 .02529 .02561 4 
.04806 .00682 -.03293 .00267 .00948 . 01100 .03661 5 
.03175 -.02149 -.05442 .05003 .05951 -.04003 -.003!12 6 
.02618 -.00978 -.06420 -.00131 .05820 -.04858 -.05200 7 
. 01702 .02453 -.03967 .01496 .07316 -.01030 -.06230 8 
-. OHJ!+2 -.02512 -. 06!1 79 -.03662 . 0365ll .01490 -.0!1740 9 
-.01940 -.03608 -.10087 .00029 .03683 -.01875 -.06615 10 
-.00784 .01858 -.08229 . 005<':0 . 0!f223 -.03519 -.10134 11 
-. 00013 .00206 -.08023 -.01260 .02963 .00355 -.09779 12 




period, " J.'; 









less than 0 and greater than or equal to -.23 in the first 
= 30 
to less than -.23 in the first period, N = 31 
22 
In Tables 6 and 7, the results of the test of independence of the size 
of the dividend change and the direction of the cumulation of returns are 
given. The size measures for the second signaling period are slightly 
different than those in the first period as a cluster analysis was also 
run for the relative change size in the second group. The results of 
both tests are the same, the size of the dividend and the truth of the 
signal are statistically independent. 
In Table 8, the results of the test of independence of the direction 
of cumulation in the first signaling period and in the second period are 
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or equal to 12/~ and less than 25% 
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Change greater than or equal to 6.25% and less than 11% 
Ch;cmge greater than or equal to 11/~ and less than 20% 
Change greater than or equal to 20% 
2 
X = 2.141 
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;~ * * 
* 0 23 * 0 32. '~ True 
;~ * * 55 
* E 27.025 * E 27.974 '" * * * First Period * * * 
************************************************ 
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0 27 * ~a1se 
* * * 61 
i'~ 
E 29.974 * E 31.025 * 
·k * * 
* * * 
************************************************ 
57 59 116 
2 
X = 2.242 
2 
X (df=l, .9 significance) 2. 706 
CHAPTER VI 
CONCLUSIONS AND A RECONCILIATION OF RESULTS 
There is the question of how the above results can be reconciled with 
the information hypothesis and several empirical studies. In general, the 
I 
results were opposite of what was expected, Presupposition of \vhat the 
results should look like has potential to bias any study, causing the re-
sults to be reHorked until they look as they "should." The results of 
.. 1.is study refute the information hypothesis, at least for firms which do 
not change their dividends for long periods, and imply that the relation-
ship between firm performance and dividend changes is somewhat instanta-
neous, performance leading change. 
The characteristics of this sample are atypical for firms of any 
~en time period. Here there are firms which do not change their divi-
dends over long periods of time. This type of change policy is far from 
similar to the population of dividend paying securities. In many cases, 
not used, a succession of dividend changes was noted, changing every second 
to fourth quarter. A non-changing dividend for more than six quarters is 
• 
Dn exception. This cDn lead our conclusions into two general areas: 
J) tl1e abnormalities of the sample have made the results ungeneralizable 
to the population, and 2) on the other hand, if we assume that all divi-
dend changes are basically alike and by holding the dividend constant 
once the change is rni:lde, we b:1ve filtered much of the noise of other 
dividend changes out of our results. The second area will be pursued 
26 
27 
in further discussion. 
Other empirical studies found, on average, that after the dividend 
increase, the security continues to earn positive abnormal returns. 
At the same time, they made no requirements about the stability of the 
dividend subsequent to the change. Thus, continued shocks or dividend 
changes biased their results upwards in the post-announcement period. 
That is to say, firm performance continued to change beirig followed up 
by the dividends. While the dividend change per se will not cause the 
price of the stock to change, it can lead to instability of price. 
The reasons for the exceptionally good performance of the dividend-
OPcreasing stocks can be explained si~ilarly • Also there is a survivor-
St, bias. That is, the way the sample was chosen, only those firms \.Jith 
40 quarters of data were used. A number of firms were found to have been 
removed from the data base subsequent to the dividend decrease and did 
not e.nter the sample. 
As reported in Section V, the relative size of the dividend change 
tad no relationship with the truth of the signal. Also, the truth of 
the previous signal does not enhance the ability to predict the truth of 
the second signal. Keeping in mind that truth is measured by the abner-
mal returns _!l_f_~-~ the change announcenent, it would seem that firm per-
formance aft2r the dividend change is independent of the dividend change. 
The higher level of dividends is hein~ supported by a prior change in 
firm performance rather than a subsequent change. It appears that the 
.-~- -,____ ~- -. -- ---·-- - --
size of the dividend change is not a signal of the size of the direction 
of the returns. Also, ~_£______:~--could not iso~-<-::_!=e any firms, a substantial 
number, that the truth of the last signal helped to predict the truth of 
the second. Their independence ~·muld again be pointed to. 
In conclusion, dividend changes are not signals of future firm per-
formance. It \,rould seem that the only information available in the 
change is that past or current performance may have changed. When we 
consider that most of the stock price adjustment is occurring before 
28 
the dividend change, the information is of no use to the investor. One 
~vould do vJell to try to predict changes in firm performance instead of 
dividend changes since the changes are generally based upon performance. 
This is not to say that dividend changes do not have the potential to 
carry information, just that few, if any, firms are using their dividends, 
''Y design or by accident, as carriers of information. Consequently, this 
implies that managers do not use their unique position to determine divi-
dend levels, so there are better signaling devices that are being used. 
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A P P E N D I X A 
DIVIDEND INCREASING SJ\Jil'LE 
ANNOU:!'1CF.t1ENT 
1\ P.2 I. D. NO. 1\ " NP11E DA'2:'E B a ____E d 
H9123 Caterpillar Tractor Co. 4/1971 1.190 • 003 -.028 .534 1. 976 
4/1973 1.071 .004 -.225 .625 2.394 
57264 Raker International Corp. ~/1971 2.161 .024 -.599 • 643 2. 9687<* 
4/1973 .735 • 033 • 021 .229 1.887 
406216 Halliburton Corp. 2/1969 • 9L:.9 .025 -.138 .202 2.180 
2/1973 . 897 • Oll .015 .410 1. 846 
582562 HcNeil Corp. . 10/1968 1. 058 .018 -. Z45 .220 2.330 
4/1973 .916 • 004 -.201 .378 2.221 
86Gl;86 S te;.rart-Warner Corp. 10/1969 1. 599 .012 -.385 .520 2.433 
1/1972 1. 546 .005 -.060 .612 2.0!;.6 
848355 Sperry Rand Corp. 5/1971 1.418 -.001 -.101 • 498 2.122 
6/1973 1.310 • 029 -.161 .579 2.267 
631226 Nashua Corp. 9/1968 1.322 -. 0125 -.185 • 308 2. 7.10 
9/1970 . 974 • 012 -.272 .313 2.522 
369604 General Electric Co. 5/1971 .601 -. 014 -.065 . 306 2.051 
9/1973 1..322 -.004 -.108 .689 2.200 
759457 Reliance Electric Co. 8/1%0 2.391 -. 015 -.120 .585 2.219 
8/1973 1.442 -.012 -.176 . 652 1. 976 
903L~22 UoV. Industries, Inc. 3/1970 1. 729 -. 021 • 030 .L:41 1.833 
3/1973 1.017 -.005 -.2('1 .369 2.356 
5591GB ~~agic Chef Inc 9/1967 o877 • 031 -.375 .216 2.632* 
5/1972 1.666 .coo - •. 232 .4-ll 2.330 
867068 Sunbeam Corp. 6/1969 1.165 -.002 -.016 .248 2.028 
6/1973 1. 519 .029 -.332 .781 2.%E.* 
620076 Motorola Inc. 6/1970 1. 903 • 004 -.387 • 530 2.467 
9/1972 1.081 • 029 -.432 .389 2.6(9* 
ANNOUNCEMENT 
I.D. NO. 
/\ /\ 1\ R2 NAME DATE B a ~ d 
181486 Clark Oil and Refining 11/1968 • 630 • 016 .106 • 054 1.753 
11/1973 1. 533 -.002 -.056 .234 2.109 
492386 Kerr-McGee Corp. 8/1971 .623 • 010 .145 .211 1.589 
2/1974 .651 • 006 .054 .142 1. 713 
907770 Union Oil of California 6/1969 1.375 .006 -.345 .478 2.668* 
10/1973 1.101 .017 -.141 .302 2.232 
863314 Stride Rite Corp. 2/1%9 • 904 .036 -.333 .261 2.644* 
2/1972 1.178 .002 -.033 .406 2.047 
912605 UaS. Shoe Corp. 9/1968 l. 085 -.009 -.449 .482 2.685* 
12/1972 .190 -.030 -.383 • 023 2.226 
30710 Ameron Inc 10/1968 1.128 .008 -.123 .331 2.17 6 
6/1972 .405 -.004 -.197 .104 2.280 
141375 Carborundum Co. 7/1970 1.373 -.006 -. 204 .534 2.254 
7/1972 .753 • 003 -.146 .219 2.249 
19573 Allied Thermal Corp. 10/1968 1. 929 -.009 -.283 • 397 2.546 
11/1972 .429 .003 -.146 • 085 2.291 
14446.5 Carrier Corp. 3/1969 • 497 -.004 -.415 .140 2.797** 
7/1972 .95.5 -.028 -.048 .246 2.059 
892892 Trane Co. 10/1969 .726 -.001 -.119 .138 2.165 
12/1972 • 645 -.005 .205 .226 1. 561 
150033 Ceca Corp 10/1969 .533 • 038 -.012 • 079 2.019 
11/1971 1;190 -. 035 -.420 .509 2.736* 
276317 Eastern Co. 8/1970 .261 -.005 -.209 • 014 2.334 
11/1972 .281 • 023 -.316 • 081 2.447 
105655 Braun Engineering 8/1969 1. 712 • 025 -.593 .545 2.841** 
8/1971 .846 -.03.5 -.309 .ll5 2.430 
ANNOUNCEMENT 
" _2. I.D. NO. NA1'1E DATE B " 1\ a ____.12 K d 
lf60146 Int 1. Paper Co. 11/1968 1.040 -.009 . 045 .5M 1. 717 
2/1973 .821 -. 011 -.299 .671 2.546 
905530 Union Camp Corp. 1/1969 1.004 . 002 -.226 .334 2. 403 
2/1972 .806 • 034 -.292 .254 2.464 
434398 Hoerner Waldorf Corp. 11/1969 1.447 .012 -.338 .316 2.603>': 
6/1972 1. 032 .015 -.219 .292 2.325 
932270 ~a1lace Bus. Forms 10/1970 1. 225 • 007 -.176 .426 2. 321+ 
7/1973 .560 -. 007 .000 .157 l. 948 
783073 R~st Craft Greeting Cards 11/1968 1.081 -. 007 -.l-47 .189 2. 272 
3/1972 1.083 -.009 -.033 .199 2.060 
260543 Dmv Cheuical 5/1971 .845 • 011 -.353 .591 2.450 
6/1973 1.099 • 026 -.138 .662 2.176 
127055 Cabot Corp. 5/1970 • 994 -.006 -.15l; .14 0 l. 940 
7/1972 .788 -.001 -.14 6 .253 2.241 
2824 Abbott Laboratories 3/l969 • 677 -.008 • 040 .287 1. 695 
3/1973 1.160 .020 -.112 .571 2.206 
599292 Miles Laboratories, Inc. 10/1963 L104 -.012 -. 035 .261 2.038 
10/1972 1.455 -. 007 -.162 .6% 2.592 
375766 Gillette Co. 4/1969 1.107 -. Oll -.387 .386 2.596* 
4/1973 .822 -.003 -.401 . Lf57 2.682* 
761525 Revlon, Inc. 10/1969 1.427 -.020 -.5.J6 .675 2.616* 
5/1973 1.002 .016 -.311 .623 2.554 
315405 Ferro Corp. 4/1969 .621 .015 .176 • 20!, 1.C44 
7/1972 .829 -.014 .171 • 236 1.568 
492746 Ke,vanee Ind. 7/1969 .617 .013 .161 • 067 1.675 
1/1973 1.010 -.011 .100 .419 1.612 
I.D. No. NAME DA:.l' t; b a. ---1? 
761753 Reynolds (RoJ.) Inds. 10/1969 .891 -.003 .026 .366 1. 917 
1/1972 .792 • 016 -.084 .216 2.108 
547779 Lowenstein (M.) & Sons, Inc. 12/1968 1.122 .020 -.147 .353 2.121 
12/1973 2.319 -.041 .055 .483 1. 786 
758556 Reeves Bros. Inc 11/1968 1. 918 .025 -.159 .690 2.289 
8/1973 .400 .000 .068 .103 1.804 
910858 United Merchants and Mfrs. 5/1969 1.091 .019 -.521 .460 2.917** 
2/1974 1. 517 -.015 -.012 .484 1. 961 
911332 United Piece Dye Works 12/1968 2.125 • 079 .056 .344 1.679 
11/1970 1.342 -.053 -.332 .155 2.560* 
95293 Blue Bell Inc 12/1968 1.530 .029 -.344 .493 2. 6oo~~ 
11/1970 1.094 • 023 .130 .440 1.616 
718592 Phillips Van Heusen 4/1970 .114 • 003 .274 • 004 1. 334* 
2/1973 1.235 .019 -.425 • 372 2.824** 
782242 Russ Togs, Inc. 3/1972 2.544 • 032 -.205 .549 2.390 
3/1974 1.873 .002 -.259 .448 2.472 
918204 V. Fo Corp. 11/1970 1.252 -.009 -.278 .386 2.530 
2/1973 1.166 • 040 -.594 .434 2.536 
158525 Champion Intl. Corp. 5/1969 1.111 .001 -.100 .217 2.068 
8/1973 1. 510 -.023 .102 .647 1. 918 
962166 Weyerhaeuser Co. 4/1969 1.242 -.002 .197 .478 1.511 
10/1972 .543 -.012 .029 .280 1.933 
497656 Kirsch Co. 8/1969 1.064 • 035 -~324 .128 2.561* 
11/1972 2.216 -.020 -.489 .516 2.945** 
608030 Mohasco Corp. 4/1969 1. 760 • 031 -.059 .368 2.067 
4/1073 1.006 -.000 -. 070 .304 2.083 
I. D. NO. NP.11E 
k:.m<oTmcmrrmT 
D1\TE 1\ B 
1\ " a _p R2 d 
374586 Giant Yellowknife Hines 2/1971 . 845 -. OJJ -.232 . 084 2.417 
8/1973 1. 925 -. 032 -. 205 .436 2.306 
369856 General Foods Corp. 2/1969 0 639 -, OOL, -,003 .283 L472 
2/1971 .947 -.003 -.265 .296 2.443 
296470 Esmark Incorporated 12/1970 1.155 -.005 -.393 .232 2.467 
12/1972 .392 .005 -.004 .158 1.830 
484098 Kane-Miller Corp. 2/1971 2. 6l~ 6 -.Oll . 2Lf3 .555 l. 428* 
4/1974 .152 -.004 -.066 .006 1. 222** 
500755 Kraftco Corp. 2/1972 • 957 .003 -.343 .327 2.573* 
4/1974 .108 -.034 -.112 • 004 1.154*1< 
134429 Campbell Soup Co. 12/1968 1.119 -.002 -.472 .544. 2.919** 
12/1972 .529 .006 .023 .202 1.813 
832696 Smucker (J.M.) Co. 6/1969 • 579 ,017 -.015 .on 2.on 
4/1973 .312 .009 .168 .073 1. 657 
751277 Ralston Purina Co. 4/1970 .t~s5 • 018 - .Lf12 .085 2.751** 
1/1973 .799 • Oll -.250 .564 2.330 
32172 Amstar Corp. ll/1970 .774 -.026 -.L~05 .350 2.467 
2/1974 .404 .004 -.141 .069 2. 277 
155177 Central Soya Co. 10/1970 1.369 . 004 . 063 • 37 3 1.858 
12/1973 1. 767 -.005 -.056 .442 2.104 
811850 Seagram Co. Ltd. 11/1968 .703 .000 - •. 409 .492 2.575* 
11/1971 .860 .004 -.175 • 296 2.250 
713448 Pepsico Inc. 5/1969 .940 .001 .062 .376 1. 741 
7/1973 1.612 .021 -.421 .859 2. 570* 
780240 Royal Crown Cola Co. 11/1968 1.270 .017 -.070 • 31~9 2.133 
11/1971 2.072 --.019 .103 .550 1. 782 
ANNOU~<CEMENT 
R2 1\ 1\ 1\ I.D. NO. NAME DATE B a --.12. d 
81689 Bendix Corp. 11/1968 1.651 -.004 -.560 • (,72 2.790** 
2/197!· .866 .020 -. 070 .203 2. 074 
235811 Dana Corp. 5/1969 1.126 .014 -.524 .490 3. 013*>'c 
3/1972 1. 756 .006 -.401 .451 2. 720* 
866713 Sun Electric Corp. 8/1968 .586 • 020 .117 . 040 1. 747 
5/1973 o801 . 031 -.129 .164 2.182 
573275 Martin Marietta Corpo 11/1968 1. 556 -.009 -.224 • 684 2.400 
11/1972 .517 .000 -. 012 .159 1. 989 
361448 Gatx Corp. 10/1968 .720 . 004 -.037 .273 2.020 
10/1972 1.045 .000 .107 • .545 1. 776 
30087 American Sterilizer Co. 8/1971 1. 643 -.025 -.428 .308 2.654* 
8/1973 1. 015 -.006 -.551 .418 3.098** 
445582 Hunt (Philip A.) Chern. 7/1971 .851 • 006 -.162 .159 2.301 
6/1973 1.623 -.012 :178 .501 1.628 
481088 Jostens, Inc 3/1968 1.311 -.008 -.063 • 3!+0 2.068 
3/1970 1.093 -. 001~ -.298 .192 2.556 
143897 Carolina Freight Carriers 6/1971 .538 -.041 -.198 .104 2.376 
7/1973 .853 -.029 -.538 .469 3.067** 
985514 Yellow Freight System 10/1968 1.302 • 026 -.594 . 591 3.169** 
10/1970 1.825 • 017 -.404 .366 2.805* 
886444 Tidewat8r Harine Service 3/1971 1.031 -.001 -.050 .128 1.960 
6/1973 .838 .on .061 .390 1. 799 
247361 Dealta Air Lines, Inc. 7/1970 1.572 .007 -.342 .543 2.506 
7/1973 1.376 -.013 .325 .753 1.3341< 
30177 American Tele. & Teleg. 11/1969 .502 -.000 -.004 .154 1.879 
8/1972 .496 -.001 -.129 .313 2.179 
ANNOUNCEMENT 
R2 I.D. NO .. NAME 
II " II DATE B a ____£ d 
171870 Cincinnati Bell, Inc. 5/1971 .738 -.001 -.201 • 357 2.372 
11/1973 .580 -.009 -.311 .232 2.497 
24735 American Broadcasting Co. 2/1970 1.971 • 047 -.169 .399 2.259 
4/1973 1.136 .020 -. 285 .413 2.530 
224003 Cox Broadcasting 10/1969 1.455 .024 -. 263 • 353 2.467 
3/1973 .997 • 035 -.060 • 302 2.105 
40555 Arizona Public Service Co. 10/1969 .813 -.005 -.294 .149 2.557 
10/1972 .514 -.006 -.274 .151 2.221 
60077 Bangor Hydro-Electric Co. 3/1971 .208 -.008 -.197 .013 2.357 
3/1973 .413 -.010 -.254 .175 2.501 
560483 Haine Public Service 5/1971 .261 -. 001 -.335 • 086 2.578* 
5/1973 • 616 -.001 -.332 .310 2.548 
694784 Pacific PoYer & Light 6/1969 .566 .013 -o326 .166 2. 6501< 
6/1971 .641 .009 -.241 .284 2.398 
604110 }'finnesota Power & Light 1/1969 .848 -.001 -.283 .391 2. 470 
1/1971 .813 -. 012 -. 291 .330 2.574* 
689648 Otter Tail Power Co. 1/1971 .205 -.008 -.163 • 027 2.087 
1/1973 .418 • 00!+ -.323 .307 2.629* 
790654 St. Jcseph Power & Light 11/1968 .556 -.000 -. 307 .475 2.175 
7/1971 .505 -.005 -.169 .317 1. 960 
826418 Sierra Pacific Power Co. 7/1972 .341 -.003 -.143 .133 2.232 
7/1974 .458 -.004 -.056 .162 2.083 
976843 Wisconsin Public Service 7/1970 .189 -.001 -.011 • 957 1. 970 
7/1972 .217 -.003 -.114 • 07 6 2.202 
698465 Panhandle Eastern Pipe Line 7/1970 .517 -.007 -.007 .115 l. 751 
11/1972 1.017 .008 -.002 .428 1. 680 
ANNOUNCEMENT 
" R2 " " I.D. NO. NA.L'1E DATE B a __E d 
882440 Taxes Gas Transmission 10/1968 1.199 .019 -.228 .441 2.300 
2/1971 1.900 • 010 .423 .711 1.145•'<* 
147339 Cascade Natural Gas Corp. 3/1969 .803 -.006 -.214 .269 2.260 
12/1972 .712 • 003 -.317 .263 2.633* 
605741 Mississippi Valley Gas Co. 8/1970 .620 -.Oll -.181 .161 2.252 
5/1973 .459 • 003 .060 .101 1.819 
645869 New Jersey Natural Gas Co. 7/1968 .912 -.013 -.432 .290 2.735* 
8/1970 .496 -.004 -.261 .ll4 2.341 
679043 Oklahoma Natural Gas Co. 10/1970 .612 -.011 -.066 .266 1.943 
4/1973 .464 .002 -.325 .329 2.527 
31141 A::nfac Inc. 10/1968 1.288 • 003 -.067 .424 2.132 
8/1971 1.265 -.038 • 030 .318 1. 914 
566319 Marcor Inc. 5/1970 1.838 -.004 .167 .325 1. 639 
5/1973 1.094 -.011 -.230 .399 2.458 
495890 Kings Dept. Stores 2/1971 1.959 -.016 .037 .359 1.886 
2/1973 .916 .021 -.278 .357 2.280 
89023 Big Bear Stores 6/1971 1.035 -.008 -.267 .203 2.423 
2/1974 1.037 .017 -.356 .199 2.639* 
491782 Ker.Hin Shops 4/1971 1.193 -.040 -.185 .135 2.362 
4/1974 1.390 -.066 -.025 .050 2. 041 
540414 Loehm::1nns, Inc. 7/1969 2.114 .031 -.480 .365 2.792* 
8/1973 1.097 .031 -.202 .334 2.192 
859145 Sterchi Brothers Stores, Inc. 12/1968 1.267 -.006 -.337 .359 2.649* 
6/1973 .740 -.000 -.183 .159 2.347 
262188 Drug Fair, Inc. 10/1969 .900 • 004 .075 .090 1.691 
1/1973 1.095 .015 .097 .545 1. 691 
ANNOUNCEHENT 
" R2 (\ 1\ I.D- NO. Nl0lli DATE B a ___E d 
912877 U.S. Trust Co. of 4/1970 1.250 -.000 -.261 .288 2.518 
New York 10/1973 .314 .009 -.120 • 043 2.063 
335554 First Na~'1 Boston Corp. 8/1970 1.033 .010 -.082 .341 1.833 
8/1972 .421 -.013 -.100 .103 2.157 
4138Lf1 Harris Bank Corp., Inc. lf/1971 l.250 • 008 .l21 .433 1. 712 
5/1973 .695 .004 -.194 .415 2.378 
585518 Mellon National Corp. 11/1970 .682 -. 007 .7.83 .2.'17 1. 419>'< 
11/1973 .899 -. 001 -.179 .273 2.214 
568237 Hacinc. Hid1and Banks 7/1970 • 904 -.008 - • .">74 .490 3.147* 
7/1972 .288 -.017 -.359 .069 2.533 
337162 First Tenn. ~at'1 Corp. l/1970 .470 .021 -.039 .093 2. 07 6 
1/1972 .534 -.005 -.285 .122 2.505 
760820 Republic of Texas Corp. 4/1970 • 901 • 004 -.270 .175 2.333 
9/1972 1.497 • 004 -.285 .547 2.499 
226322 Crock~r N?tional Corp. 2/1969 1.140 • 007 .059 .686 1. 710 
11/1971 1.164 -.003 • 030 .712 1.824 
957688 Western Bancorporation 9/1969 .596 .005 .063 .143 1. 87.8 
2/1973 . 913 -.009 -.215 • 302 2.422 
912129 U.S. Leasing Int'1, Inc. 10/1969 7.. 304 .062 -.7.96 .318 2.3?.5 
4/1972 2.150 -.009 .116 .369 2.634 
449268 I. C. Inds. 8/1969 1.890 • 011 -.292 .361 2.480 
11/1971 7. .!+42 .008 -.030 • 5RO 1. 971 
880370 Tenneco, Inc. 10/1969 1.498 -.005 -.219 .545 2.406 
10/1972 .757 , 010 -.J63 .3')5 2.206 
A P P E N D I X B 
NON-CHAHGING DIVID:t~ND SANPLE 
"3EGINNING 
I.D. NO. NJ\.."'ill DATA DATE ~ 1\ 9 R2 d ----- - ~ _8c --
882887 TexasGulf, Inc 3/1970 .761 -.003 -.037 • 080 2.038 
651639 Ne\vrnont Mining Corp. 9/1968 1.559 -.002 .254 .457 1.468 
43556 Hollinger Mines Ltd. 2/1971 .470 -.016 .196 .341 1. 558 
437614 Homestake r1ining 4/1967 .518 • 039 -.054 .041 2.1on 
n5n7Ro North American Coal 1/1968 1. 672 .006 -.335 .227 2.497 
709903 Pennzoil Co. 10/1968 1. 941 -. 038 -.397 .543 2.792** 
8687.73 Superior Oil Co. 1/1967 1.199 .012 -.074 .370 2.102 
779182 Rowan Cos. Inc. 1/1968 1.464 .010 . 041 .237 1.626 
254111 Dillingham Corp. 7/1969 1. 767 -.031 -.341 .432 2.67P 
261471 Dravo Corp. 1/1969 1.069 -. 022 -.039 .415 2.067 
580033 HcDermott (J. Ray) Co. 10/1967 1.400 .014 -.186 .274 2.361 
802037 Santa Fe Int'l 4/1968 1. 706 -.005 -.421 .488 2.841>'<* 
245217 Del Nonte Corp. 9/1967 1.135 -.015 -.456 • 307 2. 615>'< 
861504 Stokely-Van Camp, Inc. 12/1968 1.406 .003 .053 .333 1. 815 
852563 Staley (A.E.) Mfg. Co. 1/1968 • 970 -.006 -.156 .317 2.125 
24069 American Bakeries Co. 7/1970 .937 .052 -.419 .085 2.607 1< 
864592 Sucrest Corp. 1/1968 .153 • 000 -.132 • 010 2.152 
22771 Amalgamated Sugar Co. 1/1969 1.198 -.016 -.278 .601 2.262 
716026 Peter Paul Inc. 10/1968 .555 .004 -.191 • 039 2.365 
25393 American Distilling Co. 10/1969 .165 -.013 -.065 .008 2.126 
635655 National Distillers & 
Chemical 4/1970 .913 .006 -.198 .373 2.169 
532202 Liggett Group 7/1972 .347 -.049 .356 • 004 1. 028:!:* 
73239 Bayok Cigars, Inc. 10/1969 .898 -.001 -.321 .265 2.307 
BEGINi,- ";:_C\!G 
1\ 2 1\ 1\ LD. NO. NA..."I\ffi DATA DATE B a ____I?. R d 
131691 Burlington Inds. Inc. 7/1968 1.870 -.008 -.081 .417 2.004 
316549 Fieldcrest Mills 10/1970 .390 -.000 -.043 • 093 2. 0!+9 
623555 [1ount Vernon Mills, Inc. 1/1967 .561 -.002 -.233 .261 2.308 
683574 Opelika Mfg. Corp. 10/1971 .569 -.005 -.174 .216 2.207 
549662 Ludlot.;r Corp. 7/1968 1. 606 .002 -.020 .294 2.017 
408306 Hann:1ermill Paper Co. 10/1967 1.555 -.014 -.304 .294 2.591>'' 
963303 @hippany Paperboard 1/1971 .343 -.000 .287 • 042 1. 361* 
165159 Chesapeake Corp. of VA !+/1968 .889 .002 -. 074 .149 1.801 
296659 Esquire, Inc. 10/1968 1. 507 -.020 -.099 .338 1. 901 
80.3741 Scott Foresman Co. 2/1969 1.671 -o023 .077 .418 1. 728 
25321 American Cyanamid Co. 4/1969 • 677 -.026 -.503 .229 2.898** 
150843 Celanese Corp. 7/1969 1.119 -.005 -.141 • 27 5 2.163 
383883 Grace (\·LR.) Co. 10/1969 1.121 .018 -.290 .358 2.246 
857721 Stauffer Chemical Co. 4/1969 Ll95 -.008 -.175 .349 2.176 
905581 Union r.:arbide Corp 1/1969 1.172 .000 -.120 • 397 2.229 
680665 Olin Corp. 7/1970 2.129 -.005 . 063 .360 L 793 
709317 Penm.;ralt Corp. 1/1970 2.133 -.000 -.026 .610 1.843 
227111 Crompton And Knowles Corp. 7/1972 .144 -.050 .434 • 088 1. 024""* 
977385 Witco Chemical Corp. 4/1968 1.540 • 007 -.083 .451 2.131 
812302 Searle (G.D.) & Co. 7/1969 .893 .018 - .lL;l .188 2. 271 
843477 Smithk1ine Corp. 4/1972 .376 .001 .168 .080 1. 615 
852245 Squibb Corp. 1/1968 .950 .005 -.138 . 27 5 1.985 
503624 La Haur Inc. 7/1970 1.603 -.024 .018 .392 1.801 
739732 Pratt and Lambert, Inc. 1/1972 1.168 -.018 -.166 • 340 2.238 
824348 Sbenvin-Hilliams Co. 9/1970 1. 016 • 021 -.260 .449 2.447 
866645 Sun Chemical Corp. 1/1972 1.214 -. 036 -.205 .345 2.122 
BEG:. ·,:NING 
R2 I.D. NO. NAME DATA DATE 
f\ " " B a _E d ..__._____ - ... 
211813 Continental Oil Co. 10/1969 1.301 .015 -.330 .542 2.334 
565845 Marathon Oil Co. 1/1969 1.059 -.014 -.193 .209 2.348 
718507 Phillips Petroleum Co. 4/1968 .547 • 004 -.273 • 084 2.369 
822635 Shell Oil Co. 1/1969 1.649 -.014 -.367 .526 2. 710* 
830575 Skelly Oil Co. 4/1970 .886 • 011 .175 .276 1.638 
402460 Gulf Oil Corp. 7/1970 • 667 .002 -.373 .246 2. 642>'< 
339711 Flintkote Co. 1/1967 1.894 .009 • 043 • 641 1. 748 
23519 Amer<:1ce Corp. 4/1971 .994 • 016 -.292 .460 2.512 
42465 Armstrong Rubber 7/1970 • 077 .000 -. 040 .002 2.032 
608302 Hohm:i<. Rubber Co. 1/1972 .979 .022 -.314 .120 2.567* 
817814 Seton Co. 1/1970 .558 -.015 -.151 .111 2.107 
962149 Heye':!berg Shoe Mfg. Co. 1/1969 1.224 • 018 -.300 .496 2.266 
690768 Owens-Illinois, Inc. 4/1967 1.541 -.008 .555 .757 3 .07F* 
130541 Californta Portland Cement 2/1972 l. 016 .021 . 201 .477 1. 503 
5L}2290 Lone Star Inds. 7/1972 . 67 5 -.055 . 207 .116 2.106 
606215 :Hisscuri Portland Cement Co. 7/1967 .880 .004 -.086 .247 2.152 
460578 Interpotce Corp. 10/1967 1.077 .020 -.093 .198 2.179 
668605 Norton Co. 1/1968 1.482 -.000 -.433 .565 2.852** 
4571+70 Inl~::d Steel Co. 4/1968 1. 750 .010 -.148 • 772 2. 031 
594593 Hichigan Seamless Tube 11/1970 .453 -.004 -.075 .259 2.096 
22249 Aluminum Co. of America 4/1968 1.327 -.012 -. 072 .317 2.103 
217210 Copeland Corp. 4/1968 1.425 .000 -. 026 .381 1.833 
690207 Overhead Door Corp 1/1967 2.394 -.004 -.354 .689 2.460 
604739 Mj.rro Alumir1um Co. 4/1967 .660 • 015 -.202 .269 2.327 
244199 Deere and Co. 11/1967 1.035 • 004 -.316 .328 2. 513 
904274 Unarco Inds., Inc 4/1968 1.405 .006 -.040 .283 2.068 
BEGINNING 
R2 I ,D. NOo NAME DATA DATE ~ " 1\ d a __E 
261597 Dresser Inds., Inc. 5/1968 1.957 .000 .ooo • 604 1. 995 
172172 Cincinnati Milacron Inc. 1/1969 1.350 -.015 -.329 .349 2.497 
867323 Sundstrand Corp. 4/1969 1.54l -.054 .096 • 236 1.781 
481196 Joy Mfg. Co. 4/1969 1. 704 -.005 .196 .223 1. 603 
524462 Leesona Corp. 7/1967 .235 -. 032 .137 .006 1.603 
456866 Ingersoll-Rand Co. 4/1967 1.269 -.000 -.328 .627 2.651* 
23753 American Air Filter Co. 11/1966 1.231 .029 .383 .234 1.125** 
925853 Victor Comptometer Corp. 1/1969 2.535 -. 030 -.103 .392 2.200 
562706 Mangood Corp. 4/1968 1.243 -.001 • 004 .128 1. 967 
749285 RCA Corp 7/1972 1.479 -.050 -.456 .072 1. 265 
524192 Leeds & Northrup Co. 9/1972 1.669 -. 018 -.115 .269 2. 046 
810640 Scovill Hfg. Co. 1/1967 1.563 -.010 -.083 .454 2.115 
829302 Singer Co. 1/1968 1.278 .005 -.333 .537 2.495 
963320 Hhirlpool Corp. 7/1967 1.374 .015 -.028 .382 2.015 
208291 Conrac Corp. 10/1967 2.585 -.008 .090 .472 1.802 
561246 Mallory (P.R.) Co. 1/1968 1.319 .000 -.421 .379 2.041 
359370 Fruehauf Corp. 1/1967 1.045 .001 -.065 .249 2.405 
313549 Federa1-Mogaul Corp. 4/1969 .427 -.016 -.235 .122 2.442 
420758 Hayes-Albion Corp. 5/1968 1.414 -.003 -.111 .400 2.155 
775422 Rohr Industries 2/1968 1.222 .001 .222 .272 1.403 
75815 Beckman Instruments Inc. 4/1971 1.350 .014 -.152 .547 2.187 
478366 Johnson Controls, Inc. 7/1971 • 7 68 .018 -.037 .342 1.880 
752159 Ranco Inc. 1/1971 .112 -.002 .150 .005 1.611 
731095 Polaroid Corp 10/1967 1. 961 -.007 -.202 .510 2.393 
890278 Tonka Corp. 1/1968 1. 710 .027 -.164 .338 2.327 
1688 AHF, Inc. 4/1968 1.990 • 042 -.461 .628 2.899* 
667281 Northwest Airlines 1/1969 1.441 -. 020 -.015 .232 1. 988 
A P P E N D I X C 
DIVIDEND DECREASING SA}~LE 
fi..L.'IH.'&UU.:.'·' ~J..~~.l."i.l.. 
" ~2 " " LD. NO. NAi'1E DAi.S B a p l:\. d 
--
305189 Fairmont Foods Co. 10/1971 .737 -. 001 -.018 .103 1.968 
766481 Riegel Textile Corp. 10/1969 1.599 -.026 -.082 .278 2.056 
860163 Stevens (J.P.) & Co. 6/1971 1.434 • 003 -.155 .408 2.098 
4103/!2 Hanes Corp. 2/1970 1.330 -.011 • 221 .168 1.467 
624590 Hovie Star, Inc. 7/1971 1.057 -.044 -.115 .173 2.192 
293389 Ennis Business Forms !!/1971 1.032 -.011 • 204 .161 1.511 
285335 Electrographic Corp. 2/1971 .828 -.012 -.167 .588 2.318 
644171 N0\v England Nuclear Corp. 1/1969 2.210 . 036 -.224 .454 2.433 
382383 Goodrich (B.F.) Co. 11/1970 1.160 -.039 -.215 .253 2.101 
806517 Schenuit Inds. 3/1971 1.614 -·. 003 .llO . 271 1. 7 59 
929092 Vulcan Corp. 7/1970 . 579 -. 010 .333 "028 1. 259** 
69869 Basic Inc. 8/1971 1. 206 • 001 -.149 .457 2. 021 
42195 Armco Steel Corp. 1/1971 1.196 .004 -.360 . 368 2.691* 
87509 Bethlehem Steel Corp. 1/1971 1. 091 -.008 -.233 .256 2.382 
9126.'56 U.S. Stt::el Corp. 10/1971 .782 • 007 -.360 .281 2.605* 
483093 Kaiser Steel Corp 10/1970 .742 -.024 -.377 .059 2.593 
736202 Poatec, Inc. 7/1971 .537 -. 034 -.378 .158 2.573* 
483008 Kaiser Aluminum Chern. Corp. 9/1971 1.129 • 012 • 014 • 297 1.894 
369298 General Cable Corp. 9/1969 1.5ll -.030 -.491 .353 2. 930** 
629156 N. L. Inds. 11/1970 1.317 -.006 -.147 • 491 2.103 
29917 American Standard Inc. 5/1971 1.303 • 001 -.283 .259 2.557 
413342 Harnischfeger Corp. 8/1969 1. 932 • 012 -.0921 .317 2.492 
966323 Whiting Corp. 3/1971 .769 -.003 -.450 .174 2.873 
597715 Midland-Ross Corp. 12/1971 1. 576 • 004 -.242 .442 2.357 
6716 Adclressograph-Hultigraph 11/1970 1.182 -.014 .037 .159 1.827 
ANNOUNCEMENT 
" R2 " " I.D. NO. NAME DATE B a ___E d 
628862 NCR Corp. 5/1970 2.062 -.022 .070 .564 1.855 
521894 Lear Siegler Corp. 4/1971 1.528 -.030 -.282 .33 2.591* 
171196 Chrysler Corp. 2/1970 1.095 -.006 -.038 .27- 2.071 
459578 Int'l Harvester Co. 5/1971 1.071 .006 -.148 .312 2.226 
418398 Hastings Mfg. Co. 8/1969 .153 • 031 .027 .043 1.878 
97023 Boeing 1/1970 1.518 -.001 .152 .197 1.634 
954701 Stanray Corp 9/1970 2.428 -.036 -.232 ~551 2.464 
803701 Sargent-Welch Scientific 2/1971 1.199 -.034 -.336 .191 2.568* 
982594 Wurlitzer Co. 7/1970 1.329 .000 -.269 • 249 2.523 
655694 Norfolk & Western Railway 7/1970 .850 -.013 -.129 .411 2.033 
862131 Storer Broadcasting Co. 4/1968 2.220 • 024 -.452 .406 2.608* 
40879 Arkansas Louisiana Gas 10/1970 1.000 -.006 -.217 .331 2.399 
594508 Michigan Gas Utilities Co. 11/1968 .248 -.000 -.294 .062 2.456 
313855 Federal Signal Corp. 7/1972 1. 037 -.001 .106 • 297 1. 767 
934136 Hards Co., Inc. 1/1971 1.349 -.022 .016 .062 1. 938 
26879 American Investment Co. 5/1970 1.487 -.038 -.294 .302 2.449 
530710 Liberty Loan Corp. 9/1969 .956 -. 008 .052 .125 1. 766 
344872 Foote Cone Belding Comm. 7/1970 1.129 -.000 -.141 .327 2.270 
KEY FOR APPENDICES: 
1\ 
B = GLS estimated Beta, systematic risk 
f1 GLS estimated alpha, expected return 
~ Transformation value stimate from OLS 
R2 GLS goodness of fit 
d = Durbin-Hatson "d" statistic estimated by OLS 
* = Autocorrelation test, inconclusive at the 5% level 
** = Autocorrelation indicated at the 5% level 
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